

DD/S 71-3075

1 AUG 1971

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller**

**SUBJECT : Public Understanding of the Role of Intelligence**

**REFERENCE : Memo dtd 16 July 71 to Deputy Directors  
fm ExDir-Compt, same subject**

1. This memorandum is for your information only in response to referent memorandum.

2. The thoughts and comments I received from the Support components in response to referent memorandum are, I believe, excellent ones and are presented below in three parts: what we are doing today; what additional coverage might be given in the future; and general observations regarding this topic.

**a. What We Are Doing Today**

(1) A summary of our current contacts with the public are presented below; the details of these contacts are attached at Tab A.

(a) In the academic arena, we have Senior Agency Representatives assigned to five of the Senior Government Schools; we are providing about 600 speakers per annum to various School courses and other gatherings; and each year we have a large number of employees enrolled as students in Senior Schools (38 per year) and in full-time academic training at colleges and universities (about 40 per year). In addition, OTR briefers gave 11 briefings last year for academic groups with 220 persons in attendance.

(b) Briefings of other outside groups last year included nine Brookings Conferences for Businessmen; eight briefings on the CIA mission to social, civic, and professional groups; and 133 briefings for over 5,000 persons from National Security Agencies.

(c) Continuing liaison is maintained with other Government agency counterparts and related private industry by our representatives in each of the Support components.

(d) Membership and participation in professional clubs and associations is encouraged by each Support component.

(e) Comments regarding contacts by our recruiters in the field were submitted directly to you by the Director of Personnel.

**b. What Additional Coverage Might Be Given in the Future**

(1) College courses relating to "The National Decision-Making Process" and "The Economics of National Security" could be developed, and appropriate training could be offered by the Agency to appropriate professors in colleges and universities. Some examples of subject matter might be:

(a) Pearl Harbor and the handling of intelligence, a classic example of strategic warning problem.

(b) The creation of the Agency, its responsibilities, and organization.

(c) NIE and SNIE production and the organization of USIB.

(d) Agent operations using the Penkovsky case (and/or others) to illustrate the strategic implications of a good agent operation.

(e) Critical intelligence problems confronting the decision-maker.

(2) Better briefing of employees entering the Agency on how to respond to questions about the Agency. Admonitions during EOD processing frequently are never countermanded or modified or tamped-down as the years go by, and such guidance as "use your head" or "observe the need-to-know principle" serve little purpose. New employees feel that they are left with a handful of air when it comes to talking about their jobs and the Agency. Since they are spokesmen for the Agency and the role of intelligence, they should be trained to act as spokesmen; i.e., be given a positive line to follow in responding to legitimate inquiry.

(3) A much more extensive program for reaching social, civic, professional, and business groups (the community leaders of "Middle America") should be developed. The various civic clubs (such as Kiwanis) constitute a veritable national network operating at the municipal level and reaching the leaders of the community. Speaking invitations from such groups could easily be stimulated by Domestic Contact Service. These groups are not only receptive, but consider it quite a coup to get a speaker from CIA. A little parting of the mystery veil by the speaker (along the lines of our film "Need To Know") and a chance for them to ask a few questions and receive honest answers could go a long way in gaining understanding and support of the Agency.

(4) The public has been advised that the Agency has great expertise in all fields and that with the Degrees our employees hold we could start our own university. We could encourage our experts, particularly those in the Intelligence and Science and Technology Directorates, to participate more heavily in academic forums involving the specialty field or basic discipline in which they work in the Agency.

(5) A conscientious effort could be made toward developing the interest of youths in intelligence. Since most young people have had little or no contact with the Agency or its personnel, trained overt employees could be sent to high schools and colleges in response to requests for speakers. I believe that the requests would be forthcoming if the word was out that we would consider such requests favorably. The future success of the Agency will depend on our recruiting bright, young, and innovative employees who have a full understanding of the need for and role of intelligence in a free society. Through a direct contact like this, many students will realize the positive purpose of intelligence and some will become motivated toward an intelligence career.

(6) Overt staff employees in certain disciplines could be given sabbaticals for a period of residency at American universities and colleges.

(7) In relation to education, the Agency could develop a curriculum, bibliography, and teaching aides which could be used at the high school level for the teaching of the history and role of intelligence. Educators play an important part in developing the future citizen. If we could provide him with such guidance, he would be better able to impart an understanding of the function of intelligence in the decision-making process.

(8) We could make our film "Need To Know" more broadly available for showing to interested groups. I continue to believe that an employee should be present at showings of the film to respond to questions from the audience. It is believed that the mere showing of the film and the contact with an Agency employee in this fashion can dispel much of the mystery, glamour, and misconceptions centered around the Agency.

(9) An organization of Agency "Alumni" could prove to be an organized voice to comment favorably on the Agency, to give constructive viewpoints in times of trial, and to act as outside spokesmen when the Agency is not in a position to respond directly.

(10) We could prepare articles about the Agency and some of its accomplishments for publication in wide circulation magazines (such as Readers Digest) and specialized magazines. An example of this is the highly favorable article published in printing trade journals about the Agency's development of computerized typesetting.

(11) More difficult would be enlisting TV production of a CIA series similar to the FBI series but without the overt Government co-operation and controls noted in that series. Some cooperation of a "historical" nature would probably not draw severe criticism, and the resultant work could be freely adapted on a fictional basis (much like the FBI series). The important factor here would be a series showing CIA doing something colorful for specific advantage to the U. S. and to the public.

(12) First-person spy memoirs of a colorful nature might be encouraged on a highly selective basis from retirees and former employees.

(13) The Agency might seek membership in such organizations as the Rosslyn Businessman's Association and the McLean Citizens Association in light of the Agency's heavy impact on both of those areas and, likewise, a better understanding of us could be gained from bringing more local civic organizations and senior high school classes to our campus for general briefings and a look at us in our natural habitat.

(14) The briefing program directed toward the dependents of officers being assigned overseas could be expanded to provide briefings for dependents of U. S. based employees to insure that early in an officer's career his dependents learn something about the Agency.

c. General Observations Regarding This Topic

(1) The Director observed that after the "Ramparts" disclosures vis-a-vis the National Student Association and the Agency, the negative reaction to the Agency on U. S. College campuses was at a level which made any reasoned approach to explaining the Agency's function impossible at the time. When the Director spoke on 15 June, the first installments of the "Pentagon Papers" had just been published in the New York Times. Since that time, the publication of the "Pentagon Papers" per se has been completed both in the press and in paperback. Commentary in the media on the "Pentagon Papers" has been favorable to the Agency, but has underscored that the "wisdom" of the Agency was not followed, leaving the reading public with the thought "why a

Central Intelligence Agency if its collective wisdom is ignored?" At the time of the "Ramparts" disclosure, the Director observed that the winds of the storm were blowing too strongly to be heard. It would seem that the winds are blowing just as strongly now, from another direction as a result of the "Pentagon Papers."

(2) After all is said and done, one can also ask whether the "intelligence image" vis-a-vis the American public is a problem with which the Agency should be concerned. Intelligence in some form is a tool which has and will continue to exist in some form in the Executive Branch of Government. Since it is a tool of the Executive Branch, is it proper to "go to the people" to justify its continued existence in the form it now has? Intelligence has no public function as does labor, agriculture, welfare, or education. It does not provide any direct public service. Its usefulness in presenting the President with the best information and judgment available can only be maintained by carefully protecting "sources and methods." This vital protection can only suffer erosion by "going to the public." As long as "sources and methods" must continue to be fully protected, it would seem doubtful that the Agency and its role can ever be creditably presented to the American public. Attempts to do so will continuously create situations challenging its creditability and repeatedly reopen its "public image" issue.

(3) If we decided to go the route of providing speakers to civic and businessmen groups throughout the country, the following statistics reflect the timetable which would be involved:

"There are 454 cities in the United States with a population between 25,000 and 50,000; 232 with a population between 50,000 and 100,000; and 153 with a population of 100,000 or more. For a starter, one man giving an average of three briefings a week, could, in one year, speak once in all American cities with a population of 100,000 or more. If he makes one appearance in the 100,000 to 500,000 cities and speaks an average of six times each in the 26 biggest cities (500,000 and over), it could be done in two years or by two men in one year. This is illustrative of some of the possibilities in this kind of community-relations program."

(4) The Director's speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors explained the role of intelligence in an excellent way. His recent trip to the Middle East on behalf of the President was a public expression of the President's confidence in him and though not intentionally publicized, it did get wide coverage in the world press.



In 1972, the Agency will celebrate its 25th anniversary. It might be appropriate on that occasion to work toward some low key publicity. A publicly announced visit by the President and a release of his statement concerning the Agency might be appropriate as would a statement by the Director. In fact, TV and radio coverage would not be entirely out of order. We have a year to prepare for it.

(5) The public could be made more aware of the Intelligence and Science and Technology Directorates roles of this Agency and thereby remove some of the focus from the spying and covert action role of the Clandestine Service.

3. Although I recognize that some of the thoughts and ideas expressed above may not be feasible from the cost and/or effort standpoint, I believe that we should look at all approaches before we decide the course of action we will take in attempting to resolve this problem.

4. Attached at Tab B is a thoughtful response from a former CT in the Support Directorate which was prepared after seeing a copy of referent memorandum. I thought you, too, might find it interesting.

157 17 1801 15 11 1971

John W. Coffey  
Deputy Director  
for Support

## 2 Attachments

EO-DD/S:CND:es (3 Aug 71)

### Distribution:

- Orig - Adse w/atts
- 1 - ER w/atts
- ✓ 1 - DD/S subject w/atts
- 1 - DD/S chrono

## WHAT WE ARE DOING TODAY

### 1. Office of Training

a. Senior Agency representatives are now on detail to the National War College, Army War College, Defense Intelligence School, National Interdepartmental Seminar, and Navy War College. (A request from the Air War College is now pending.) These individuals have a unique opportunity to present and explain the role of intelligence to attendees at these Schools and to Seminars conducted by these Schools for prominent American businessmen and academicians.

b. Briefings for outside groups during FY 1971, examples: nine Brookings Conferences for Businessmen which were attended by 260 businessmen; 11 briefings for academic groups which were attended by 220 students; eight briefings on the CIA mission were given by OTR briefers to social, civic, and professional groups; and 133 briefings by OTR briefers for over 5,000 persons from the National Security Agencies.

c. CIA students enrolled in Senior Schools (War Colleges and their civilian equivalents) and full-time academic training have an excellent opportunity to explain the role of intelligence and dispel misconceptions regarding the Agency to fellow students. OTR has three day orientation for these students to prepare them for their role as Ambassadors for Intelligence and the Agency. Our students going outside are our best salesmen and the ripple effect of their attendance in a variety of courses increases their influence far beyond just those people they contact directly. This effort is low-key, personal, and in response to a national curiosity on the part of our students' class members. Since those we send are usually top-notch people, the impression we are making in this arena should be good.

d. Over 300 Agency employees are involved in providing briefings at various courses and gatherings.

### 2. Office of Communications

a. OC is in constant liaison with other Government agencies involved in the communications field and with the communications electronics industry. A number of the technical programs sponsored by OC are imaginative and pace-setting, and this fact is not lost to our Governmental counterparts nor to the civilian contractors with whom we work.

### **3. Office of Medical Services**

a. We have continuing liaison with the Medical Director of the Foreign Service and with medical officials of the U. S. Public Health Service, the U. S. Civil Service Commission, NSA, and the Military Services.

b. Several of our staff Medical officers are members of the Council of Federal Medical Directors.

c. Several of our staff Medical officers and staff psychologists hold teaching appointments at local medical schools and universities.

d. Our three professional consultant panels (Clinical, Psychiatric, and Psychological) are continuing means for improving the understanding of the Agency mission. These panels, made up of eminent professionals in their respective fields, are convened several times each year here at headquarters. By way of example, the Clinical Consultant Panel is composed of the Medical Directors of the following industrial organizations:



e. Psychologists of our Psychological Services Staff in recent years have with increasing frequency received approval for the publication of certain works in professional journals.

### **4. Office of Security**

a. This spring [redacted] attended the Presidential Classroom for Young Americans as the Agency Representative. Some 2,000 high school students from all over the country attended and all had serious misconceptions regarding the Agency. [redacted] was able to dispel these misconceptions during his various discussions with the students. His report regarding this activity is attached hereto.

### **5. Office of Logistics**

a. Our engineers, contracting and procurement officers and senior Printing Services Division personnel are members of professional societies in their fields and are in frequent attendance at their meetings and conferences.

b. We have heavy contact with private business firms with whom we have contracts and those which are interested in having their products considered for Agency use.



c. We have extensive contact with other Government agencies for whom we provide contracting services and from whom we procure materiel and services.

6. Office of Finance

a. A number of our officers hold membership in the Federal Government Accountants Association, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and the American Management Association. Their membership in these organizations and their participation in the meetings, seminars, and conferences is encouraged.

7. Office of Personnel

Their comments were submitted directly to your office in accordance with your request in referent memorandum.

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## PART I

The student body of the Presidential Classroom for Young Americans was composed of students from many diverse backgrounds. Students ranged from 16 to 18 years of age and were usually in their senior year of high school. Students represented high schools from all of the states, territories and overseas schools of the Departments of State and Defense. Most minority groups and ethnical backgrounds were represented. All students paid a \$200 tuition and had to supply their own transportation to Washington and back home. In most cases the school or local groups paid the student's tuition and travel expenses and in the case of the Upwardbound students, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare paid their expenses. Each class lasted for one week and was made up of approximately 320 students. The students came with a common concern about their government and put forth an amazing effort to make the program and their experience a success. In order to illustrate their sincerity and maturity, there was only one discipline action necessary during the six-week period in which nearly 2,000 students participated. They displayed a concerned and matured attitude as well as a self-disciplined approach to their in-depth study of government.

## PART II

The attitude of the students toward government in general will assist in understanding their opinions and misconception of the Central Intelligence Agency. The writer is of the opinion that there is a direct relationship between their impression of government and their perception of the Agency. They looked at government as a group of bureaucrats who performed their duties to sustain the status quo. Since many students believed that the government was out of contact with the people, the sensitivity of the bureaucracy to the needs and desires of the citizen was seriously questioned. Furthermore, their image of the government and their characterization of the civil servant was derived from second and third hand sources since many students had never had any

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contact with the government until attending the Presidential Classroom. The government was perceived as primarily a conservative force which served as an impediment to the progress of the country. The student was unaware of the problems and forces which confronted government. Thus, while the students were sincere and honest in their constructive criticism and to some extent disenchanted with the responsiveness of government, they illustrated a sense of naivety and lack of historical perspective concerning the problems and the dilemma of government.

### PART III

In considering the student's attitudes toward the Agency, there arose four major concerns. First, they maintained that the Agency was conducting domestic spying and gathering files on civilians. Second, they were under the impression that the Agency had no checks on its activities. Third, they viewed the total function of the Agency as a group of "spies" running around the country and the world assassinating left-wingers and overthrowing governments who disagreed with the policy of the United States. Fourth, they assumed that the Agency was an inherent policy formulating and directing body.

A very real misunderstanding of the students was their fear that the Agency was conducting activities in the United States. There was an unawareness among the students of the scope and limitations of the Agency. Their misnomers arose from the fact that they did not understand the function nor the use of intelligence and had a total misconception of the role and application of intelligence. Their fears of the activities of the Agency in the United States were based strictly on misinformation and conjecture. Fundamentally, the CIA is a spy outfit and, therefore, must spy on the citizens of the United States.

Many students contended that the Agency had no checks on its activities and even went so far as to consider it a totally autonomous organization within itself without any outside direction.

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They contended that money was either appropriated directly or funds were diverted from other expenditures to the Agency to carry out any mission it deemed necessary.

The students' main image of the Agency was derived from second and third hand sources. The "Mission Impossible" and "James Bond" pictures of the Agency was a very real concept. Practically none of the students had either read or come into contact with any primary information concerning the Agency. While it was hard to comprehend why students who were concerned about government had such a naive and disillusioned opinion of the Agency, it was a fact that they were totally misinformed and out of contact with information that could clarify and explain the function of the Agency. In relation to this point, the students were amazed that a person could write the Agency for an application. They opined that Agency employees are recruited by some mysterious person who would appear from no where and select a person for a career with the CIA. Furthermore, besides the routine requirements and outstanding qualities which all employers seek in their employees the students assumed that there was some insidious and elusive quality which one has acquired during a life time and is needed for Agency employment.

The final misconception of the students was their lack of knowledge of the structure of government. Since most students were unaware and uninformed about the National Security Council, they maintained that the Agency was a policy formulating organization. The assumption was apparent in their discussion that the Agency determined its own goals and there was no coordination of intelligence activities with National Security. Furthermore, the students had little knowledge of the history of intelligence in the United States and believed that the CIA anteceded the events of the Second World War. They were unaware of the events of post World War II period which prompted the need for an intelligence organization to be maintained during peace time.

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The information with which the students entered the discussion was based primarily on hearsay information. My discussion with the students was centered on an attempt to make the Agency a more realistic part of the government and how it fit into the foreign policy making structure of the Executive Branch. As the students brought up their views concerning the Agency they were readily willing to listen to an explanation and understanding of its functions. Once the ground work was formulated the title of my discussion "The Role of Intelligence in a Free Society" became more apparent to them. The emphasis during the discussion centered on the need and function of foreign intelligence in assisting the policy formulation and decision making of the President. While concentrating on and using the events at Pearl Harbor as a take off point and emphasizing the responsibility of intelligence in a modern world, the realization was brought to the student that intelligence is a positive force which can prevent world conflict rather than their impression that intelligence will lead to conflict.

The positive aspects of intelligence were demonstrated to the students. Upon completion of the discussion of the role of intelligence in a free society, the students departed with a much more receptive opinion towards the need and function of intelligence and the Agency. It is believed that the mere contact with an Agency employee assisted in dispelling the glamour and misconceptions of the Agency. The students went away with the impression that the Agency personnel is composed of capable, well-trained, and self-disciplined individuals. There was little doubt that the open discussion with the students served to close the gap which existed between the student's view of the Agency and its actual function.

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23 July 1971

IDEAS:

1. Start by better informing the Agency's own employees on "the true and overall functions of intelligence." Nowhere is this need as great as in the support areas where people are far removed from Agency intelligence products. If individual Agency employees try to aid public understanding of intelligence, let them be informed Agency employees.

2. Begin to dissolve the "paranoia" open employees present when asked about the Agency. Most citizens will ask very little, and they might appreciate a straightforward answer--even a no comment.

3. Encourage open employees to join professional associations and attend meetings and conferences. As friendships are developed in these associations more of these publics can be informed about the role of intelligence and of the Agency in producing national intelligence.

4. Allow, encourage and provide Agency speakers to fan out throughout the nation to speak to interested public and private groups. Don't push, just let it be known to speakers bureaus that Agency spokesmen are available for the sundry lecture circuits.

Mr. White gave an enjoyable and informative talk about the Agency and the role of intelligence (my wife says it's more than I'd told her) to the wives of Agency employees last summer. Talks, like Mr. White's, by Agency management to various American publics could aid these publics in understanding the role of intelligence and the Agency in national security affairs.

5. Don't pass out "truth kits" like the Office of Training gives to employees going out to universities on extended training. Some segments of the public might be satisfied with the documents in the package--other segments of the public would only become more alienated.

6. Unless there is an attitude of let sleeping dogs lie--the people's representatives in the Congress offer an important public group that needs to have a minimum basic understanding of the role of intelligence and the Agency's role in national intelligence production.

7. At some future date, possibly the intelligence community as a whole could create an Archive of open information, exhibits (the process of national intelligence production), and memorabilia; a place that would be a regular stop for tourists to Washington, D.C. Locate the site away from the Agency. Possibly the Smithsonian Institute would cooperate in such a future undertaking.

8. Media

a. Film--the Agency has got to have the talent to put together an even better film than the one shown last year--Need To Know. Such a film can be shown in conjunction with traveling Agency speakers or on its own to groups requesting it.

b. Books, pamphlets--no more than the books and/or pamphlets used by recruiters. Smacks too much of public relations. Our constituency for printed matter should remain the President, the NSC, the intelligence community, etc.

c. Newspapers (interviews) minimal--too easily misquoted to millions.

d. TV (series) a gung ho P.R. effort would probably try to land us a series a la FBI or O'Hara: U.S. Treasury. Remember Rod Randall and O.S.S. Let's stay real and not become plastic Jesus'.

e. TV (interview) DCI only. Not for quite some time--time is not right. Have the DCI do a whole 1 1/2 hour evening interview show. Preferably David Frost (English) or Dick Cavett--both tend to be better interviewers. Arrangements can be made if shows are interested. Show can probably be taped in D.C. Host would want some preplanning, but no staged questions and/or answers.

I realize this suggestion is laden with some risks and uncertainties (e.g. Cavett would probably ask questions resulting from previous interviews with former Captain Robert Murasco and Dr. Daniel Ellsberg.) I suggest this as a wider forum for aiding public understanding of the role of intelligence and the Agency as explained by the DCI. Individual employees of the Agency to a large degree are here in Washington, D.C. Their public is rather small.

f. Magazines (interview)--the magazine chosen would depend on the target group. After 4 1/2 years I would still suggest Playboy as the magazine, if the target is youth. Playboy has a large pass around potential.

MJR

Atts:

Assumptions

Asides

ASSUMPTIONS:

1. By "structured approach to a better public understanding of intelligence," I assume this does not mean the establishment of a full blown Agency public relations program. A public relations program would tend to be seen as an Agency admission of insecurity about either its role, its objectivity, or the user's review of our product. It would also leave us open, and rightfully so, to the same kind of criticism the military is receiving in "The Selling of the Pentagon."
2. That the Agency's basic constituency is the President and his NSC.
3. That the Agency (through individuals or collectively as an organization) be candid within limits, honest, and just, when presenting itself openly to the public.
4. People under cover are not involved in aiding public understanding about intelligence.

ASIDES:

Ideas not called for by the memorandum.

1. During the past year in school, the one area that stood out as a public misunderstanding of the role of intelligence is the area of estimating the intentions of other national leaderships. Most people hit me with the past trespasses of the Agency as reported in the press. Also most people figure "spies" find out about missiles, planes and/or armies and that they study the economies of other nations and snap pictures from the sky. Boo spies! But one idea that even more radical students could begin to accept as a needed function of our Agency is this:

That in order not to make a misjudgment about the intentions of other national leaderships, which could level to a nuclear exchange, there is a continuing need in today's world for an intelligence apparatus to inform the President as accurately and/or objectively as possible of the intentions of other national leaderships.

The converse is pointed out by the students--the need for our opponents to do the same concerning American leadership.

In the area of gaining information on the intentions of other national leaderships, the role of intelligence and/or the Agency would be worthwhile to explain to the public.

2. We will only do harm to ourselves if we become neurotic about "The Agency's Image." Images are not real substance, they are what dreams are made of. The only crucial publics that must be convinced always about the need for intelligence are us, the employees of this Agency, the consumers of our finished national intelligence products, and our financiers.

There is no being "The Agency" to have an image. There are only us. . . people. . . intelligence careerists. No amount of low key selling of "The Agency", no amount of attempts to convince the American people of the need for intelligence, no amount of image making will do us good in the end.



Our need exists as long as we humans are trying to stay alive in a world of unsolved problems.

A turn to even low key public relations gimmicks by our Agency would mean we doubt ourselves--we doubt our product to stand on its own merits.

I say the above because public understanding in juxtaposition with convince the American people and structured approach to public understanding doesn't meld.

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

# OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Deputy Director for Support		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

## Remarks:

*Response sent to Col. as to 6.30 p.m. 71.*

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Executive Director-Comptroller	16 July 71

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Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP84-00780R004200150004-8

Executive Registry

FILE

*Personnel 15*

*71-3819*

DD/S *71-2827*

16 July 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director for Intelligence  
Deputy Director for Plans  
~~Deputy Director for Support~~  
Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT : Public Understanding of the Role of Intelligence

1. During the question-and-answer period following the Director's 15 June State of the Agency address, he was asked whether "there's more that all of us as individuals and collectively can do to help Americans in public and private life better understand the true and the overall functions of intelligence?" In the course of his response to this question, he said:

"I think there is more that can be done to put intelligence in a better perspective in the mind of our compatriots, and we're going to be looking at this and checking on ways to do this with increasing frequency. In point of fact, the speech to which you refer (American Society of Newspaper Editors) was an effort to kick this thing off and see if we can get a hearing in this modern context and it was clear that we did. I think by and large the speech was relatively well accepted. So we're going to try and get a quiet program together and over a period of weeks and months see if we can't do a better job of trying to convince Americans that they need intelligence, which obviously they do."

2. In the weeks ahead I plan to discuss with the Director what he has in mind. At that time I want to present an inventory of current activity which meets the criteria of informing public and private sectors about the value of intelligence and the CIA function. At the same time I would like to be in a position to offer suggestions on what more should be done. We have discussed this topic several times in connection with the Management Advisory Group's 18 November 1970 memorandum on "The Agency's Image," but we may have reached the point where additional forward movement toward a structured approach to a better public understanding of intelligence will require some fresh thinking reduced to writing.

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declassification

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3. Please prepare a brief paper by 2 August on what you are doing and what more can be done. I am asking the information addressees of this memorandum to forward any thoughts they may have on this topic.



25X

L. K. White  
Executive Director-Comptroller

cc: D/DCI/NIPE  
D/Personnel  
General Counsel  
Inspector General  
Asst. to DCI   
D/ONE  
D/PPB  
DTR

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